The intersection of Theory of Mind (ToM) processing and complex narrative comprehension in high functioning autism was examined by comparing cortical activation during the reading of passages that required inferences based on either intentions, emotional states, or physical causality. Right hemisphere activation was substantially greater for all sentences in the autism group than in a matched control group suggesting decreased LH capacity in autism resulting in a spillover of processing to RH homologs. Moreover, the ToM network was disrupted. The autism group showed similar activation for all inference types in the right temporo-parietal component of the ToM network whereas the control participants selectively activated this network only when appropriate. The autism group had lower functional connectivity within the ToM network and also between the ToM and a left hemisphere language network. Furthermore, the within-network functional connectivity in autism was correlated with the size of the anterior portion of the corpus callosum.
Autism involves primary impairments in language comprehension and pragmatics, or the ability to use language to communicate effectively in social contexts (Lord & Paul, 1997; Tager-Flusberg, 1981 , 1996 Wilkinson, 1998) . These pragmatic language impairments are thought to be related to deficits in Theory of Mind, or the capacity to make inferences about what others think, feel and know (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Baron-Cohen, 1988; Happé, 1993; Tager-Flusberg, 1993 , 1997 . Several studies have found atypical brain activation in autism during the processing of language (Harris et al., 2006; Just, Cherkassky, Keller, & Minshew, 2004; Kana, Keller, Cherkassky, Minshew, & Just, 2006) and during mental state attribution or Theory of Mind tasks (Castelli, Frith, Happé, & Frith, 2002; Schultz et al., 2003 on the comprehension of irony found significantly higher activation in Theory of Mind regions in autism, indicating the difficulty participants with autism face in tasks that involve language and Theory of Mind (Wang, Lee, Sigman, & Dapretto, 2006) . The interrelationship of the processes of language comprehension and Theory of Mind in individuals with autism may profitably be examined within the context of discourse processing, in which understanding the intentionality of the protagonist plays a central role (Gernsbacher, Hallada, & Robertson, 1998) . Neuroimaging research with typical individuals suggests that whereas there are many lower level processes involved in discourse comprehension (such as language processing at the word and sentence levels), discourse critically involves processing at higher levels (Ferstl, 2006; Ferstl, Neumann, Bogler, & von Cramon, 2007) . We have proposed a model of approximately five Parallel Networks of Discourse (Mason & Just, 2006) that process figurative and meta-sentence level information during discourse comprehension. These networks include: a coarse semantic processing network (right middle and superior temporal), a coherence monitoring network (bilateral dorso-
